01769nas a2200169   4500008004100000022001300041245006200054210005800116260003300174300002000207490000800227520127200235100001801507700001601525700001701541856004101558       2007                        eng d  a0027842400aThe Precursors of Governance in the Maine Lobster Fishery0 aPrecursors of Governance in the Maine Lobster Fishery  bNational Academy of Sciences  app. 15212-152170 v1043 aCollective action is more likely to occur and to be effective when it is consistent with the self-interest of the affected individuals. The Maine lobster fishery is an instructive example of biological and technological circumstances combining with individual self-interest to create conditions favorable to collective action. The model describes the way social structure emerges from the adaptive behavior of competing fishers. Fishers compete in two ways: in a scramble to find the lobsters first and by directly interfering in other fishers’ ability to compete, i.e., by cutting their traps. Both forms of competition lead fishers to interact frequently and to self-organize into relatively small groups. They learn to restrain their competitive behavior toward their neighbors but do not extend that same restraint to nonneighbors. Groups work within well defined boundaries, contact one another frequently, actively exchange information about the resource, and, most importantly, depend on continuing mutual restraint for their economic well-being. These self-organizing, competitive processes lay the foundation for successful collective action, i.e., mutual agreements that create the additional restraint required for conservation. (truncated from original)1 aWilson, James1 aYan, Liying1 aWilson, Carl  uhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/25449115